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I.

Introduction

For purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Section
1251, et. seq. (the "CWA") the restraints on interbasin
transfers are basically similar to the restraints on water
diversions in general. Therefore, an attempt was made to
discuss those sections of the CWA which are relevant in this
sense, on the assumption that this analysis will be of value to
those involved in such transfers. Hdwever, emphasis has been
placed on those areas which have the greatest potential for
affecting interbasin transfers of water.

II. History and Goals of the Clean Water Act

A. History

Passage of Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. Section 1251 et. seq. represented a different approach
to controlling water pollution. Past legislation had focused
on utilizing water quality standards and stream
classifications, but that was unworkable and unenforceable.
The 1972 system was based on the fact that no one had the right
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to use the nation's waters as a waste disposal mechanism. NO
discharges were allowed from point sources without a CWA
Section 402(NECES) or Section 404 permit, 33 U.S.C. Section
1342, and Section 1344. 2 A Legislative History of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, pgs. 1254, 1303.

B. Goals and Objectives

1.

"The objective of this Act is to restore and maintain

the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters..." GA Section 101(a), 33 U.S.C. Section
1251(a).

2. Eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable
waters by 1985; fishable, swimmable water by 1983;
discharge of toxic pollutants prohibited. CWA Section
101(a), 33 U.S.C. Section 1251(a).

3. Courts read goals charitably in light of the purposes
to be served echoing Justice Holmes statement: "A river is
more than an amenity, it is a treasure." State of New
Jersey v. State of New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342, 51 S. Ct.
478 (1931). Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman
597 F. 2d 617, 625 (8th Cir. 1979); EPA v. State Resources
Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 203, 96 S. Ct 2022, 48 L. Ed.
2d 578 (1976).
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III. CWA Section 208, 33 U.S.C. Section 1288

A.

General

Sections 208(a) and (b) provide for the development of
areawide waste treatment management plans through the planning
process by designated agencies. Plans are applicable to all
wastes and shall include recommendations on siting for
wastewater treatment plants.

B.

Siting

1. The federal funding requirements of Section 208(d)
basically dictate siting of wastewater treatment plants
due to federal funding.

2. Reductions in federal funding may diminish future
effects.

3.

Importance of siting for water users:

a) Metro Denver Sewage Disposal Dist No. 1 v. FRAC,
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179 Colo. 36, 499 P. 2d 1190(1972); District moved
sewage discharge point and ditch company was required
to pay costs for pumping back into ditch.

b) Thayer v. City of Rawlins, Wyo., 594 P. 2d
951(1979); City changed effluent discharge point of
imported water, thus eliminating certain water
users. Those users had no right to demand the
continued flow of that water.

4. Process

Water users must involve themselves in the 208
process, both locally and at the state adoption level, to
insure that their water rights are protected. See
Harrison and Woodruff, "Accomodations of the Appropriation
Doctrine and Federal Goals Under Sections 208 and 404 of
P.L. 92-500 and Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899, 22 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute,
941(1976).

C. Section (f)-(k) - "Best Management Practices"

1. 208 plans are required to identify and set forth
procedures and methods (including land use requirements)

to control various non-point sources--agriculture,
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silviculture, mine drainage, construction activities, salt
water intrusions, etc.

2. To the extent such controls are enforceable, they may
require greater consumptive uses, thus jeopardizing
downstream water users.

3. BMP's are utilized in 401 certification and NPDES
permits.

D. Enforceability

1. Federal

a) Section 208(d) —Construction grants will not be
authorized unless they are in conformity with an
approved plan.

b) Section 208(e) --No NPDES permit shall be issued
for any point source which is in conflict with an
approved plan.

2. State and Local

a) Plans become enforceable to the extent that local
or state governments adopt regulations implementing
the plan.
0-6

E. Case Study--Northwest Colorado Council of Governments
Areawide Water Quality Management (208) Plan.

1. Attempt by local governments to diminish adverse
effects of interbasin diversions on the basin of origin.

2. Utilization of 208 process to assist in development of
ordinances for local governments, but ultimate authority
must rest with those local governments. 208 agencies do
not become mini-federal agencies by virtue of the CWA.

3. Grand County ordinances affecting interbasin transfers
of water. Denver v. Berglund, 517 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo.
1981). Although basis of this case concerned NEPA, FLPMA
and federal rights of way, independent authority was found
upholding applicability of county regulations to the
Williams Fork Project. The court found that as a matter
of state law, the county regulations were not preempted by
constitutional claims argued by the City of Denver.
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TV. (MA Section 303, 33 U.S.C., Section 1313--Water Quality
Standards

A. Process

1.

States (and in their absence, EPA) adopt water quality

standards including designated uses of the water and
numeric criteria based on those uses. Section 303(c) (2).

2. Standards based on health, welfare, fish and wildlife,
public water supplies, recreation, agriculture, industry,
and others. Section (c)(2).

3. EPA reviews state standards and makes the final
decision. Section 303(c)(3) and (4).

4. Present regulations, 40 LVR 35.1550 et. seq. are
undergoing extensive revision by current administration:
EPA's involvement will diminish; emphasis on site specific
studies rather than "Red Book" numbers; and easing up of
variance requirements.
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B. Effect on water users and enforceability

1. Water quality standards are not enforceable per se,
but they must be included in setting discharge limitations
in NPDES permits. CWA Section 402(a), 401, 301(b)(1)(c),
40 CFR Section 122 62(b).

2. More stringent limitations often translate into
consumptive treatment techniques, thus jeopardizing
downstream water users.

3. State 401 certification of 404 permits

4. See discussion under Part V concerning dams and
diversion pipes as point sources and the effects of NPDES
permits.

C. Salinity

1. EPA established salinity standards for the Colorado
River Basin which were upheld in EDF v. Costle, 16 EEC
1185 (D.C. Cit. 1981). "Proposed Water Quality Standards
for Salinity Including Numeric Criteria and Plan of
Implementation for Salinity Control," as modified,
Aug., 1975.
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2. Colorado River Basin standards set numbers on three
dams, but no state-line numbers. The implementation of
certain projects to improve salinity was considered part
of the "standards."

3. Although EPA's approach was considered reasonable by
the Court, future administrations could set state-line
numbers which must be "backtracked" into permits and
utilized for 401 certification. Such requirements could
cause additional consumptive uses affecting water
diversions. If dams are point sources, then water
projects could be directly affected. See discussion of
National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 16 ERC 2025
(D.D.C. 1982) at V.E., 1, (b).

4. State 401 certification requires compliance with water
quality standards, including salinity.

D. Section 303(d), Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL's)

1. Section 303(d) requires states to identify water
quality limited streams and to set waste load allocations
for those streams. Thus pollutant loadings would be set
on such streams and the "pie" would be divided up by local
authorities.
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2. This section is being emphasized by the present
administration despite its resource intensive requirements.

3. What happens if a water diverter brings interbasin
water into a stream with TMDL's already established?

a) Possible point source subject to NPDES
requirements: "discharge of pollutants" CWA Section
402, 502(12), (14), and (19). IMF v. Gorsuch, supra.

4. No apparent control under CWA if a diverter removes
water from a basin and upsets the balance on a TMDL
stream. Although, local 208 regulations may be able to
force mitigation requirements.

V. Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES). CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. Section 1342.

A. NPDES discharge permits required for the discharge of a
pollutant from a point source into navigable waters.

1. Activities sanctioned under CWA Section 318
(aquaculture projects) and Section 404 (dredge and fill)
are exempt. CWA Section 402(a)(1).
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2. Discharges must conform with:

a) Section 301—water quality standards and effluent
limitations

b) Section 302--water quality related effluent
lhnitations

c) Section 306—new source performance standards

d) Section 307—toxic and pretreatment standards

e) Section 308—inspection and mcnitoring
requirements

f) Section 403—ocean discharge requirements

g) "such conditions as the Administrator determines
are necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act." Section 402(a)(1). This phrase is the origin
of the phrase "BET" (best engineering judgment), now
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"BPJ" (best professional judgment) which is utilized
to support permit requirements in the absence of
state

CT

federal effluent limitations. "EM? 's" (Best

management practices) are derived from Section 304(e)
and this section.

3. NO NPDES permits for discharges composed entirely of
return flows from irrigated agriculture. CWA Section
402(e).

B.

Mbst states have assumed NPDES programs through CWA

Section 402(b), but EPA retains a veto power over all permits.
(MA Section 402(d). See 40 CFR Part 122, Subparts A and D, and
40 CFR Part 124, Subparts A, D, E and F for EPA administered
programs. See 40 CFR Part 123, Subparts A and D for state
administered programs.

C.

Pertinent definitions:

1. Pollutant (CWA Section 502 (6))

2. Discharge of a pollutant ((MA Section 502 (12))

3. Point source ((MA Section 502 (14))
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D. NPDES and Consumptive Uses

1.

Increasing levels of CWA requirements often result in

treatment technologies with additional levels of
ccnsumptive use--often the least expensive alternative.

2.

EPA should include water rights considerations in

developing technology based effluent limitations:

a) Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351,
1369 (4th Cir. 1976).

b) Section 304(b)(1)(B) requires consideration of
non-water quality environmental impacts which should
include water rights.

c) Weyerhaueser Co. v. Costle, 590 F 2d 1011 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Castle, 17 ERC
1054 (1st Cir. 1980). (Court upheld highly
evaporative technique to achieve zero discharge of
pollutants.)
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d) In practice, EPA continues to conclude that in
BPT and BAT guideline

development, the effects on

water rights are minimal.

3. Ability of water users to protect water rights
"consumed" for water quality purposes:

a) Supremacy clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, Section 2
and its inter-relationship with interstate compacts.

b) The Colorado experience:

(1) C.R.S. 1973, 25-8-101, et. seq. (Supp.
1981); in particular: 25-8-102(1) and (2),
25-8-104, 25-8-203(c) (e), and (f), and
25-8-503(5).

(2) Colo. Const. Art. XVI, Sections 5 and 6
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(3) Colorado appears to allow for incidental
effects to occur to water rights; but if a
material injury occurs, then the state water
court system will determine who will pay.
Permits "necessary to protect the public health"
are not affected.

(c) NWF v. Gorsuch, supra at p.2040, 2041. NPDES

permits can incidentally affect water rights, despite
Wallop Amendment language.

(d) Wallop Amendment, CWA Section 101(g), 33 U.S.C.
Section 1251(g). See discussion in Section "F"
below. The basic issue focuses on to what extent the
Wallop Amendment allows water quality requirements to
infringe on water rights.

E. Dams and Diversion Structures as Point Sources

1. Dams

(a) South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander,
457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978). Dams could be
discharging pollutants.
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(b) National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 16 ERC
2025 (D.D.C. 1982).

(1) Dams are point sources subject to NPDES
permits.

(2) Dams and attendant resevoirs add pollutants
to navigable waters even though it is the "same"
river:

(i) create pollutants that would not exist
"but for" the dam and reservoir

(ii) processes occurring as a result of
the dam reservoir operation result in the
addition of pollutants (rejection of
argument that river cannot "add" to itself)

(3) Sediment, dissolved metals, low dissolved
oxygen, cold water and supersaturation are
pollutants created and added by dam operation
and pollutants are controllable by application
of technology.
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(4) Pollutants arguably regulated by
Section

IOWA

208 and upstream point source controls.

Those controls exist, but they do not affect
point source determination vis-a-vis dams.

(5) CWA Section 304(f)(a)(F) allows for EPA to
issue guidelines for nonpoint source pollution
caused by "changes in the movement, flow or
circulation of any navigable waters.. .including
changes caused by the construction of dams..."
This also does not negate point source
considerations.

(6) Court rejected Wallop amendment arguments
in reasoning that any effects on water rights
would be incidental.

(7) Liberal interpretation of CWA: Court
reasoned that constricted interpretation of the
definitions was in error--the Court looked to
the scientific information to determine the real
effect of the activity on the water body.
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(8) New breed of scientific opinions? Is the
Judge an aquatic biologist?

(c) Missouri v. Dept. of the Army, 17 ERC 1001 1 1006
(8th Cir. 1982). Operation of the dam did not result
in the "discharge of a pollutant" because such
discharge requires an "addition" of a pollutant from
a "point source" and neither term applies to soil
erosion or the oxygen content of the water.
Unfortunately neither the Court of Appeals or the
District Court gave any explanation as to how they
arrived at this conclusion.

2. Diversions

a. Arguably addition of pollutants from point source

(1) pipes are point sources
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(2) diverted water could contain "pollutants"

(3) diverted water could cause violations of
water quality standards and TMDL's

(4) NWF v. Gorsuch, supra. suggests that the
judge should look at the effects of the
activity. Also, "but for" the pipe, no addition
of pollutants.

(5) U.S. v. Earth Sciences, 599 F. 2d 368, 373
(10th dr. 1979.) Broad reading of "point
source" found with the overflow of a sump pond.

b. Purposes of the discharge is irrelevant in
evaluating whether a pollutant is discharged.

(1) Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman,
supra. at 627. Definition of pollutant has only
two specific exclusions in the CWA.
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(2) NWF v. Gorsuch, supra. at 2033: NPDES

program was intended to be comprehensive and to
cover any situation encompassed by the statutory
language. See also U.S. v. Earth Sciences,
Inc., Supra., Sierra Club v. Abston Construction
Co., Inc., 620 F. 2d 41 (5th Cit. 1980); and
NRDC v. Costle, 568 F. 2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

(3) ArB Cattle Co. v. United States, 196 Colo.
539, 589 P. 2d 57 (1978). In this case, the
Colorado Supreme Court certified to the Court of
Claims that under Colorado law, a diverter was
not entitled to the silt content in the water.
By analogy, a diverter is then only entitled to
divert "water" and has no rights in the
diversion of other elements of that water,
namely pollutants. Thus, by bringing water into
another basin, the diverter could arguably be
required to treat the pollutants.
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c. Interbasin diversions as "foreign" water are
arguably more susceptible to NPDES permits than other
diversions.

(1) CWA only requires treatment of pollutants
which a facility adds to the water it diverts.
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F. 2d 1351
(4th Cir. 1976) The theory is that a permitee
only treats the pollutants which are added in
the process--the rest of the water and its
original pollutants "pass through."

(2) Water diverters from different basins
cannot claim that they are passing through the
same water from the river--they are bringing in
"foreign" water, thus adding pollutants. But,
arguably they are not affecting the diverted
water if it is in a pipe. Open ditches and dams
could be changing the quality.

3. Arguments against NPUES are similar to those raised
in V., D., 3. above.
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F. Wallop Amendment, GA Section 101(g), 33 U.S.C. Section
1251(g)

1.

1977 Amendment to the (MA:

It is the policy of the Congress that the authority
of each State to allocate quantities of water within its
jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated

CT

otherwise impaired by this Act. It is the further policy
of Congress that nothing in this Act shall be construed to
supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which
have been established by any State. Federal agencies
shall co-operate with State and local agencies to develop
comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate
pollution in concert with programs for managing water
resources (MA Section 101(g).

2.

Legislative History

a) See Attachment I for legislative history quoted
at length.
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b)

Pertinent sections:

...Legitimate water quality measures authorized

by this act may at times have some effect on the
method of water usage. Water quality standards
(and)....requirements of section 402 and 404 permits
may incidentally affect individual water rights... .It
is not the purpose of this amendment to prohibit
those incidental effects. It is the purpose of this
amendment to insure that State allocation systems are
not subverted and that effects on individual rights,
if any, are prompted by legitimate and necessary
water quality considerations.

c)

Effects

Thus, the CKA may not abrogate, supersede CT
impair state authority, but the Act may cause some
injury to individual water rights. The unanswered
question is how much?

(1) "Incidentally" not defined

(2) Relationship to "material injury", i.e.
Colorado legislation, see Part TV, D.
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(3) No indication of who bears the financial

burden

(4) no indication of how direct or indirect the
necessary water quality considerations must be.

(5) Note that the Wallop amendment is a policy
statement and arguably cannot nullify specific
grants of jurisdiction in other sections of the
Act. Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Federal
Power Commission, 324 U.S. 515, 527, 65 S. Ct.
749 (1945).

d) Compare discussions of Wallop Amendment in
Riverside Irrigation District et. al. v. Stipo, Civil
Action NO. 80-K-624, (D.Colo ), Brief of National
Wildlife Federation (In Support of Summary Judgment),
pgs. 27-31 and Brief of Plaintiff-Intervenors
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, et.
al., No.'s 80-2142, 2241, 2242, (10th Cir.), pgs.
14-18.
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VI. CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. Section 1344

A. Basic Provisions

1. Section 404(a) requires a permit from the U.S. Army,
Corps of Engineers ("COE") for the discharge of dredged or
fill material into navigable waters at specified disposal
sites. Generally, see Schlauch and Strickland, Changing
Land to Water: The Alchemy of the Wetlands Regulatory
Scheme, 27 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 635
(1982); Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit
Program Enters Its Adolescence: An Institutional and
Programmatic Perspective, 8 Ecology L.Q. 410 (1980); 33
C.F.R. Part 320; 40 C.F.R. Part 230; Fed. Reg., Vol. 45,
No. 184, Sept. 19, 1980 (Proposed, but undergoing agency
revision).

(a) Although origins of Section 404 derive from the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, Section
13 (Refuse Act), 33 U.S.C. Sections 401-418 (1976),
for jurisdictional purposes the definition of
navigable waters utilized for Section 404 purposes is
derived from the CWA, thus encompassing the broadest
constitutional interpretation of waters of the United
States. 33 C.F.R., Section 323.2(a), ftnt. #2; NRDC
v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp 685 (D.D.C. 1975); Leslie
Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F. 2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978):
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(1) territorial seas

(2) coastal and inland waters, lakes, rivers,
and streams that are navigable waters, including
adjacent wetlands

(3) tributaries to navigable waters, including
adjacent wetlands (manmade irrigation ditches on
dry land are excluded)

(4) interstate waters and tributaries,
including adjacent wetlands

(5) all other waters of the United States, such
as isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent
streams, prairie potholes, and other waters not
tributary to navigable waters, the degradation
or destruction of which could affect interstate
conmerce.

(b) "Wetlands" are defined to include "those areas
that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground
water at a frequency and duration to support, and
that under normal circumstances do support, a
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prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life
in saturated soil conditions..." 33 C.F.R. Section
323.2(c). Thus, Section 404 will extend to many
areas considered to be land by the uninformed and
unsuspecting person.

(1) Broad Court interpretation: Aroyelles
Sportsman's League v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp.
278 (4.D.L. 1981).

(c) "Discharge of dredged material" is the addition
of excavated or dredged material from waters of the
United States back into such waters. 33 C.F.R.
Section 323.2(1)

(d) "Fill material" is any material used for the
primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry
land

CT

changing the bottom elevation. 33 C.F.R.

Section 323.2 (m). Discharging fill material is
simply the addition of that material to waters of the
United States. 33 C.F.R. Section 323.2(n).

2. Pollutants discharged primarily for waste disposal
purposes are regulated by Section 402, not Section 404.
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3.

Dredging material from waters of the United States

and depositing it on dry land does not require a Section
404 permit.

4.

General permits exist for certain categories of

activities that will cause "only minimal individual and
cumulative adverse environmental impact." 33 C.F.R.
Section 323.2(p), Oa Section 404(e)(1). These permits
must comply with the EPA 404(b) guidelines, 40 C.F.R. Part
230.

5.

Nationwide permits exist for discharges into certain

waters. 33 C.F.R. Section 323.2(q), Section 323.4-2. For
example: lakes smaller than 10 acres or streams less than
5 cfs.

6.

33 C.F.R. Section 323.4-4 grants discretionary

authority for the COE to require individual permits if the
concerns of the aquatic environment (40 C.F.R. Part 230)
indicate the need for such action because of individual
and/or cumulative adverse impacts to the affected waters.

7.

Although the 404 process is administered by the (DE,

EPA has a veto authority over all permits. Section 404(c).
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8. States and/or EPA must provide or waive a CWA Section
401 certification on all Section 404 permits, CWA Section
401(a)(1), 33 C.F.R. Section 320.4(d). A denial of such
certification will prevent that permit from being issued.
33 C.F.R. 320.4(j)(6).

B. Specific Restraints on Interbasin Transfers

1.

Delay in issuance of Section 404 permit

2.

Conditions placed in Individual Permits or denials of

such permits as a result of WE review. The WE utilizes
the following sections to determine what conditions are
necessary:

(a) Public interest review, 33 C.F.R. Section
320.4(a).

(1) Permits will not be granted unless they are
determined to be in the public interest. The
impact is balanced against the intended use and
all relevant factors must be considered:
conservation, economics, aesthetics,
environmental concerns, fish and wildlife, flood
prevention, land use, navigation, recreation,
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water supply, water quality, energy needs,
safety, food production, and, in general, the
needs and welfare of the people. Evaluation
criteria are listed at 33 C.F.R. Section
320.4(a)(2).

(2) Applicants can satisfy all technical
requirements of 404(b) guidelines and still be
denied a permit. It has been suggested that
this section is routinely utilized by the COE to
require mitigation requirements of applicants
that might otherwise be questionable. Parish
and Morgan, History, Practice and Emerging
Problems of Wetlands Regulation: Reconsidering
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, Land and
Water Law Review, Vol. XVII, NO. 1, 1982.

(3) Permits may be denied on environmental
grounds, in other words, the (DE is not limited
to water quality or navigable concerns. Zabel
v. Tabb, 430 F. 2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1972).
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(b) Effect on Wetlands, 33 C.F.R. Section 320.4(b)

(1) Permits will not be issued for projects
which will unnecessarily alter

CT

destroy

wetlands. NO permit will be issued in
"important wetlands," 33 C.F.R. Section
320.4(b)(2), unless the benefits outweigh the
damage.

(2) Alternative sites may be required. 33
C.F.R. Section 320.4(b)(4), 40 C.F.R. Section
230.10(a)(3).

(3) NO permit will issue unless practicable
steps will be taken to minimize adverse impacts
on the aquatic ecosystem. 40 C.F.R. Section
230.10(d).

(c) Fish and Wildlife, 33 C.F.R. Section 320.4(c);
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C.
Sections 661-666.

(1) Applicants "will be urged to modify" their
proposals to eliminate
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mitigate damage to the

conservation of wildlife resources. The COE
consults with various agencies concerning the
direct and indirect effects of the project.
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(2) corps will apply 404(b) guidelines, 40
C.F.R. Part 230.

(3) EPA may veto a 404 permit based on fish and
wildlife considerations. CWA Section 404(c), 33
U.S.C. Section 1344(c).

(4) Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C.
Section 1531-1543 (1976 and Supp. III 1979).

(i) ESA, Section 7, 16 U.S.C. Section
1536, ccernands all federal agencies to
insure that actions authorized, funded,
or carried out by them do not jeopardize
the continued existence of an endangered
pecies or result in the destruction or
modification of the critical habitat of
such species. See Erdheim, The Wake of
the Snail Darter: Insuring the
Effectiveness of Section 7 of the
Engangered Species Act, Ecology Law
Quarterly, Vol. 9, NO. 4, 1981.
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(ii)Section 7, if brought into play in
any interbasin project, can result in a
denial of the project altogether, or the
imposition of mitigation measures. The
ESA mandates affirmative preservation of
endangered species and their habitat.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 173, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 57 L. Ed.
2d 117 (1978); North Slope Borough V.
Andrus, 642 F. 2d 589, 607 (3.C. dr.
1980).

(iii)Agencies are required to consult
formally with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service pursuant to ESA Section 7. The
burden is on the agency, and it is a
large burden, for the courts have held
that a "low threshold of possible effect"
on an endangered species or its critical
habitat triggers the consultation
requirement. Romero-I3arcelo v. Brown,
643 F. 2d 835, 837 (1st dir. 1981).
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(iv)Unlike other wildlife areas where
the COE is the final authority in
mitigation measures, for purposes of the
ESA, the conclusions of the Secretary of
the Interior are final. Thus the ODE is
bound by the biological opinion. 40
C.F.R. Section 230.30(c). Sierra Club v.
Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455, 469
(N.D.N.Y., 1980).

(v) Direct, indirect, and cumulative
effects on an endangered species are to
be considered. In National Wildlife
Federation v. Coleman, 529 F. 2d 359 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976)
the Fifth Circuit enjoined construction
of a highway based on habitat loss due to
indirect effects of the
highway--residential and commercial
development on private land.

(vi)Indirect effects could include
controlling the releases of water from
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dams to protect an endangered species or
critical habitat. T.V.A. v. Hill, supra.
concerned the operation of the Tellico
Dam.

(vii) Presently, it is the opinion of
the Solicitor for the Department of the
Interior that cumulative, direct and
indirect effects are to be considered,
but not the effects of future projects.
M-36938, 88 I.D. 903 (1981).

(viii) Although Section 7 is directed to
federal actions, the question arises as
to the applicability of Section 7 to
state programs which are the
implementation of federal legislation,
i.e. the NPDES Program. The Supreme
Court has determined that the EPA veto of
a state issued NPDES permit was federal
"agency action." Crown Simpson Pulp Co.
v. Costle, 455 U.S. 193, 100 S.Ct. 1093
(1980). Although this was the
disapproval of a permit with active EPA
involvement, the case raises the question
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as to whether EPA peripheral involvement
could trigger Section 7 of the ESA for
state purposes. In addition, in EPA's
approval of state NPDES programs, could
the state be required to include Section
7 considerations?

(d) Water Quality, 33 C.F.R. Section 320.4(d)

(1) State or EPA 401 certification, or
waiver, must be received for a 404 permit to
issue within certain time limits. Such
certification is directed towards violations
of water quality standards and effluent
limitations.

(2) Should the removal of water from a basin
cause violations of a state water quality
standard, then a state denial of 401
certification would prevent the issuance of a
404 permit.

(e) Other possible sources of controls on
interbasin projects through Section 404:

(1) Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 33 C.F.R.
Section 320.4(e)
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(2) National Historic Preservation Act of
1966, 33 C.F.R. Section 320.4(e)

(3) Nation Landmarks, Wilderness Areas,
Seashores, MCnuments, etc., 33 C.F.R. Section
320.4(e)

(4) Coastal Zone Management Act, 33 C.F.R.
Section 320.4(h)

(5) Marine Protection Research and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 C.F.R. Section
320.4(i)

(6) National Environmental Policy Act, 33
C.F.R. Sections 320.3(d) and 320.4(j)(4).
NEPA is always an important consideration in
any interbasin project. The role of EPA and
other federal agencies in advising the lead
agency can be a very powerful one.

0-38

C. The "Taking"

1.

The

Issue

Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

prohibits the taking of private property by governments
without just compensation. But it is possible for
governments to take away some uses of property without
payment in order to promote the general welfare.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct.
158 (1922); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).

2.

Courts have not found a "taking" to have occurred

in Section 404 permit denials, despite enormous
financial consequences on the developer.

(a) Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F. 2d 1184
(Ct. Cl. 1981). Deltona had property on the
Florida coast which had been divided into sections
for development. Early parcels had been developed,
but the federal 404 rules changed in mid-stream,
and later parcels were denied Section 404 permits.
No taking occurred because there was only a
diminution in value and not complete destruction,
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the statutes and regulatons advanced ligitimate
government interests, and the land had enormous
residual value. See also Jentgen v. United States,
657 F. 2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981).

(b) Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
100 S.

Ct. 383 (1979). (Case under Rivers and

Harbors Appropriation Act). The Supreme Court
found a taking based on governmental attempts to
exceed ordinary regulation

CT

improvement for

navigation by requiring public access to a private
pond. This pond had been dredged and made
accessible by the developers and had thus become
"navigable waters."

3. If mitigation measures are upheld on an interbasin
project that cause a diminution in that water right,
compensation may not be available.

D. Case Study--Riverside Irrigation District v. Stipo

1. Case focuses on the legality of the COE to regulate
water releases for the Wildcat Dam in Colorado to assure
minimum stream flows for the protection of an endangered
species—the whooping crane. The critical habitat is
350 miles downstream from the dam in Nebraska.
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2.

Case is now in Federal District Court, Denver,

Judge Kane, Civil Action NO. 80-K-624 after remand from
the Tenth Circuit, 658 F. 2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981), to
decide the water issue.

3.

Federal authority is based on CWA Sections 101 and

404, the Endangered Species Act, and the Supremacy
Clause.

4.

Riverside relies on the Wallop Amendment, the South

Platte River Compact and the Colorado Constitution.

VII. Conclusion

The ability of the (MA to impose restraints on interbasin
transfers of water is very real. Presently, most restraints would
be achieved through Section 404 and Section 401. Other less
certain sources of restraints can be found in Section 303 and
Section 402. But, there is no doubt that entities involved in
interbasin transfers of water should focus considerable attention
on this Act.
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ATTACHMENT
Legislative History of the Wallop Firendment

The conferees accepted an amendment which will reassure the
State that it is the policy of Congress that the Clean Water Act
will not be used for the purpose of interfering with State water
rights systems. I sponsored this amendment with Senator Hart on
the floor of the Senate. This amendment carne immediately after
the release of the Issue and Option Papers for the Water Resource
Policy Study now being conducted by the Water Resources Council.
Several of the options contained in that paper called for the use of
Federal water quality legislation to effect Federal purposes that
were not strictly related to water quality. Those other purposes
might include, but were not limited to Federal land use planning,
plant siting and production planning purposes. This "State's jurisdiction" amendment reaffirms that it is the policy of Congress that
this act is to be used for water quality purposes only. [Sec. 5; Sec.
101 FWPCA)
The amendment simply states that it is the policy of Congress
that - the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water
within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this act. It also states that,it is the further policy
of Congress that nothing in this act will be construed for the
purpose of superseding or abrogating rights to quantities of water
which have been established by a State.
This amendment is not intended to create a new cause of action.
It is not intended to change present law, for a similar prohibition is
contained in section 510 of the act. This amendment does seek to
clarify the policy of Congress concerning the proper role of Federal
water quality legislation in relation to Staff.: water law. Legitimate
water quality measures authorized by this act may at times have
some effect on the method of water usage. Water quality standards
and their upgrading are legitimate and necessary under this act.
The requirements of section 402 and 404 permits may incidentally
affect individual water rights. Management practices developed
through State or local 208 planning units may also incidentally
effect the use of water under an individual water right. It is not
the purpose of this amendment to prohibit those incidental effects.
It is the purpose of this amendment to insure that State allocation
systems are not subverted, and that effects on individual rights, if
any, are prompted by legitimate and necessary water quality considerations.
This amendment is an attempt to recognize the historic allocation rights contained in State constitutions.
It is designed to protect historic rights from mischievous abrogation by those who would use an act, designed solely to protect
water quality and wetlands, for other purposes. It does not interfere with the legitimate purposes for which the act was designed.
The amendment speaks only—but significantly—to the rights of
States to allocate quantities of their water and to determine priority uses. It recognizes the differences in types of water law across
the Nation. It recognizes patterns of use.
When Wyoming became a State and the Congress ratified our
constitution in the Act of Admission, that constitution stated then
and states today:

-

The water of all natural streams, springs, or lakes or other collections of still
water within the boundaries of this State are hereby declared to be the property of
the State.

Water quality and interstate movement is an acceptable Federal
role and influence. But the States historic tights to allocate quantity, and establish priority of usage remains inviolate because of this
amendment. The Water Pollution Control Act was designed to
protect the quality of water and to protect critical wetlands in
concert with the various States. In short a responsible Federal role.
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